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Abstract
Nanotechnologies are considered to be one of the spearheads of emerging technolo-
gies. They are qualified by some as a new technological revolution, in the sense that 
they can change the way humans perceive ourselves and relate to our natural and social 
environments. If a human activity is thought to cause such revolutionary changes, it 
should be accompanied by a reflection. In order to give such a reflection an ethical 
dimension we need to fix a framework, a set of commonly accepted definitions of con-
cepts and terminology. Questions like: «what does being nanotechnological mean?» do 
not seem satisfactorily answered, or the answers given to date do not seem to satisfy all 
stakeholders. We analyze the lacks in some of the definitions found in available litera-
ture. From this analysis, and taking as a basis the philosophical paradigm of epistemic 
realism, which we claim it could be adequate for ethics purposes, we go on to propose 
an approach which, we argue, could motivate further thinking on definitions that 
could serve ethics reflection on nanotechnologies.
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Resum
Les nanotecnologies són considerades una de les puntes de llança de les tecnologies 
emergents. Alguns fins i tot les qualifiquen com una nova revolució tecnològica, en el 
sentit que poden canviar la manera en que els humans ens percebem a nosaltres matei-
xos i com ens relacionem amb el nostre entorn social i natural. Si una determinada 
activitat humana pot comportar canvis tan revolucionaris, hauria d’anar acompanyada 
d’una reflexió. Per tal de donar a aquesta reflexió una dimensió ètica, és convenient 
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fixar un marc, un conjunt de definicions de conceptes i terminologia acceptada. Pre-
guntes com ara: què significa «ser nanotecnològic»? no semblen estar respostes de ma-
nera totalment satisfactòria, o al menys les respostes donades fins ara no semblen satis-
fer a tots els afectats. Analitzem les mancances en algunes de les definicions trobades a 
la literatura disponible. A partir d’aquesta anàlisi, i prenent com a base el paradigma 
filosòfic del realisme epistèmic, del qual afirmem que pot ser adequat per propòsits 
ètics, proposem un enfocament que entenem que pot motivar el pensament sobre no-
ves definicions que puguin ajudar en la reflexió ètica sobre les nanotecnologies.
Paraules clau: Nanotecnologia, Ètica, Epistemologia, Definició.
1. Introduction
Nanoscience and nanotechnology are considered part of what some authors call 
emerging and converging technologies, the spearheads of scientific research and tech-
nological development in all kind of fields. Thus, whenever a research line receives the 
«nano» label, in no matter what field, it automatically conveys the idea of techno-sci-
entific novelty. Nanotechnological applications can be very different in biology, me- 
dicine, chemistry, physics, materials science, engineering, electronics, or security. 
Consequently, terms like «nanomedicine», «nanochemistry», «nanobiology», «nanoe-
lectronics», etc. are commonly used to refer to the applications on «nanotechniques» to 
different fields of science and technology. In order to point out this kind of transversal-
ity, some authors prefer to refer to «nanotechnologies» instead of «nanotechnology» 
(Gordijn, 2005).
Some sources, including the National Nanotechnology Initiative, affirm that pro-
gress in nanosciences and nanotechnologies, and the world of possibilities that this 
progress entails, could imply a new technological revolution (National Nanotechno-
logy Initiative, 2000). If that is so, then a reflection is needed; and not only a general 
philosophical reflection, but also a reflection centered in the ethical and social issues 
which originate from these stunning novelties.
Before trying to give an answer to many other relevant questions, or as an early step 
in the reflection process, there is a primary concern to be addressed: we need to fix, as 
much as possible, the reflection framework. We need to agree on the reference and the 
scope of our reflection. If our aim were to perform an ethical reflection on weaponry 
we would first have to define what a weapon is, even if we agree that the border be-
tween being and not being a weapon can be very vague. The same way, if it is our inten-
tion to reflect on something called «nanotechnology», first we have to try to find out, 
if vaguely, where the border between being «nano» and not being «nano» is. We could 
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consider this to be the problem of meaning, which will determine the reference frame-
work of nanoscience and nanotechnologies (ObservatoryNano 2009). An ethical re-
flection on a given entity and on its implications can be hindered if we do not have a 
fairly clear idea of what we are referring to when we use the linguistic repertory associa-
ted to that given entity.
The 2010 ANEC/BEUC inventory lists examples of 475 products available on the 
EU market claiming to contain nanoparticles (ANEC/BEUC, 2010). According to the 
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (2011), over 1300 nano-based 
products are commercialized worldwide, and these include commodities, cosmetics, 
pharmaceuticals, materials or electronic devices. And this figure continues to increase. 
Nevertheless, the only criterion for being included in this inventory is not an epis-
temic one but merely the manufacturers’ declaration (Woodrow Wilson International 
Center for Scholars, 2011). Actually, there are still no fully agreed standards of what 
«being nano» means for a product. The European Commission feels committed to 
solve this need, and has published a new definition of «nanomaterial» (Official Journal 
of the European Union, 2011), but this definition does not seem to fully satisfy every-
one, and criticism has immediately aroused (Clark, 2011), (NanoWerk News, 2011), 
(MD avec l’équipe Avicenn, 2011).
Therefore, one of the first problems that we must face when beginning a reflection 
on a new field of knowledge or an emerging technology, as is the case of nanoscience 
and nanotechnology, is the meaning of words and concepts. Only by doing so can 
we reasonably fix the scope of reflection. The questions that we should be able to 
answer are one way or another summarized in the generic «what do “nanoscience” 
and “nanotechnology” mean?». And this question includes others which range from 
«How do we recognize a single entity as “nanotechnological”?» –assuming that «be-
ing nanotechnological» is something that may be predicated of some entities– to «Is 
the intention of a manufacturer or researcher reason enough to give the «nano» label 
to the object of their work?». Moreover, is nanotechnology always something really 
new, or is it sometimes only a new terminology for already existing knowledge or 
applications? Is there an ontological basis or a good epistemological reason for us to 
believe that there is a differentiated scope of knowledge deserving a specific new 
terminology?
There is still no agreement within the scientific community on these questions. But 
the significant number of marketed products labeled as «nanotechnology», and the fact 
that the «nanotechnology» tag is already a widely used tool, by both public and private 
funding institutions, demands such an agreement.
This paper analyzes different kinds of definitions used in the area of nanoscience 
and nanotechnology. After examining the problems that these definitions show, the 
paper proposes an epistemically realist reflection as an adequate approach to the kind 
of definition that could be appropriate when the final purpose is moral reflection.
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2. Definitions
The defining of things may differ depending on the function or purpose of the 
definition. The defining (and the definition) of «gold» will not be the same if it is made 
by a jeweler, a chemist, a poet or someone who is writing a dictionary. Even if the four 
of them, prima facie, are referring to the same entity –the substance known as «gold»– 
the approaches will be different. In this sense, a definition with positive regulatory 
functions may be different from a definition whose intention is to indicate the object 
of philosophical reflection, even if both have the same entity as reference. According to 
the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, «The different definitions can perhaps be 
subsumed under the Aristotelian formula that a definition gives the essence of a thing».1 
If this is accepted, then a realist approach –including notions like concept, substance or 
essence as existing things– could be adequate in order to find a definition that responds 
to the function of interest for an ethical reflection on nanotechnologies. Then, the 
relevant question is «what are the actual facts that make a particular entity nanotech-
nological as compared to others that are not?», or «which real fact or set of existing 
circumstances make that particular «nanotechnological entity» interesting?». These 
questions drive us to the fundamental one: what is to be nanotechnological? What is 
the essence of nanotechnology?
2.1 Current definitions
There is a general recognition that there is a lack of consensus definitions in «nanoter-
minology» (Mantovani, Porcari, Morrison, & Geertsma, 2010), (Maynard, 2011), 
(Stamm, 2011), (Euractiv.com, 2011). Besides that, there are particular demands on 
certain terms like «nanomaterial» (AmCham, EU, 2010), (SCENIHR, 2010) or «nano-
particle» (Schmid & Fenske, 2010).
In response to a petition of the European Commission, the Scientific Committee on 
Emerging and Newly Identified Health Risks (SCENIHR) gave its opinion on what 
they consider the essential elements, from a scientific point of view, to elaborate a 
working definition with regulatory purposes of the term «nanomaterial». This opinion 
gives also an analysis of the criteria used in the different definitions that can be found 
in specialized literature. According to the SCENIHR, size is the main defining element 
in every definition of nano-scale and nanomaterial. They also recommend taking into 
account the size distribution and the standard deviation, as well as the specific surface 
(in relation to volume, not to mass). Despite admitting that there is no scientific evi-
dence as to whether a given size determines the «nano» characteristic of a product, they 
consider it important to use measurable criteria as their main aim is regulatory. It is in 
1 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/definitions/. Accessed 8 April 2011
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this sense that the SCENIHR accepts size as the main definition criterion and propose 
accepting the conventional agreement of the 1 to 100 nanometers range for size and of 
60 m2/cm3 as the lower limit for the surface/volume ratio (SCENIHR, 2010).
But the fact is that it is not yet fully clear whether the use of the prefix «nano» in 
terms like «nanomaterial», «nanoparticle», «nanoscience», «nanotechnology» or «nano-
structured» in both the specialized literature and in generalist publications is always 
epistemologically justified if their intention is to refer to things different than «materi-
al», «particle», «science», «technology» or «structured» respectively. Thus, it seems neces-
sary to deepen the reflection about the uses of this terminology (Nanowerk, 2010), 
(International Alliance for NanoEHS Harmonization).
A first step could be approaching to a conceptual definition of «nanotechnology», and 
we could start with an analysis of what can be found in the scientific literature. The clas-
sification proposed by Schummer (2007) is clarifying in order to summarize these defini-
tions. The entry «Definitions» of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Gupta, 2009) 
can also be helpful in this sense, and we will use it eventually as a complement.
2.1.1 Nominal definitions
Nominal definitions seek to define a term with a set of necessary and sufficient con-
ditions. In order to simplify, we could say that nominal definitions are the definitions 
that we usually find in a dictionary. This would be the case for the most commonly 
used «nano-» definitions. There are other definitions, compatible with this kind, that 
define «nanoscience» as the study of matter and its properties, and nanotechnology as 
the manipulation, design and/or creation of materials, devices, products or functions 
at the nanometric scale, a scale commonly defined as the range between 1 and 100 nano-
meters (1 nm = 10-9m) (Hunt & Mehta, 2006).
Thus, according to this set of definitions, all those entities in which at least one of 
its dimensions is within the 1-100 nm range are considered objects of nanoscience or 
nanotechnology. Therefore, if we follow the nominal definitions scheme, size is the 
necessary and sufficient condition for being «nanotechnological». This definitions fo-
cus almost exclusively on size. This is an interesting option from the regulatory point 
of view, because the stipulation of a specific range of size, a measurable property, great-
ly facilitates the task of identification/classification of entities.
According to the SCENIHR (2010) «there is no scientific evidence in favour of a 
single upper limit. However, there is by general consensus an upper limit of 100 nm 
which is commonly used. There is no scientific evidence to qualify the appropriateness 
of this value»2 Thus, the sizes given as benchmarks in this type of definitions are in fact 
2 SCENHIR, op.cit.
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arbitrary or stipulated. Such definitions could thus also be included in the so-called 
«stipulated definitions» appearing in the entry «Definitions» of the Stanford Encyclope-
dia of Philosophy (Gupta 2009). These solutions can be considered reasonable when the 
goal is of a pragmatic nature, such as legislation, but of little epistemic value –funda-
mental, in our opinion– when the purpose is related to ethical reflection. The different 
size scales are themselves conventional means that we use to measure space, instruments 
used to characterize objects in a relative way (in relation to a given scale) and/or to com-
pare/classify things according to their sizes. But from a realist point of view, when pre-
dicating something substantial of a given entity, there should be a good reason for it, i.e. 
there should be a causal relationship between what is predicated and a real fact or set of 
real facts. For instance: if we classify a given object as «microscopic», as belonging to 
what we define as «the microscopic world», it is not because this object is in the micro-
metric range, but because it cannot be seen by the naked human eye. The truth is that 
there is a number of tiny entities that a normal human being is unable to see without 
the help of an external device (a microscope), due to their smallness. Within the natu-
rally limited microscopic world, being micrometric is instead arbitrary, accidental. For 
the microscopic world the essential real fact includes the participation of human beings, 
not as conscious creators of an arbitrary criterion based in the metric scale, but as hold-
ers of a capacity –eyesight or the perception through the eyes of a specific range of light 
spectra– that is naturally limited. This natural human limit is thus part of the essence of 
«being microscopic». In a similar way, from a realistic point of view, if it were true that 
being «nanotechnological» was something real the fact of being «nanotechnological» 
would have to be causally related to a real fact, even if this real fact was in one way or 
another connected to the interaction that humans have with the objects in question.
On the other hand we now know that nanometric particles exist, either naturally 
produced or as byproducts of given human activities, and that they have always been 
present in our lives or were even produced back in Ancients Rome and Egypt with 
technical purposes and used as cosmetics, pigments or weapons, long time before we 
were aware of their nanometric condition (Walter, et al., 2006), (Mitin, Sementsov, 
Vagidov, 2010), (Reibold; Paufler; Levin; & Kochm, 2006). Is it correct to say that 
Romans or Egyptians were working on «nanotechnology» thousands of years ago?
Besides, taken literally, nominal definitions could embrace almost every field of sci-
ence and technology dealing with material objects, because most materials can in one 
way or another be considered «nanostructured» since their molecular structure, at the 
nanometric level, is always responsible for some of the properties in which their tech-
nological uses are based.
Strictly following this definition nanotechnology does not seem to entail anything 
new, other than the name itself. In fact, a nominal definition of nanotechnology can 
be used by some companies and researchers to label their products and researches as 
«nano», only as a launch pad.
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2.1.2 Teleological definitions
Other approaches define the nanotechnological nature of objects taking their future 
uses or goals as a reference. This is what Schummer (2007) calls the teleological ap-
proach. These goals can be general values such as health, security or wellbeing, or rela-
tive values like «smaller», «stronger» or «cheaper». In any case, teleological definitions of 
nanotechnology are expressed as visions of a future technology that will radically change 
every dimension of human life. Following this definition, a research could be qualified 
as «nanotechnological» if it helps to carry out these visions of nanotechnology, i.e., if it 
helps to achieve the expected or predicted goals. These objectives range from «shape the 
world, atom by atom», to trans-humanist ideas which raise even an hypothetical «im-
mortality» of human beings. These forecasts could be directly qualified as science-fiction 
and seem more intended for shaking emotions than for producing knowledge.
The main objection to definitions of this kind is that these visions are generally 
scientifically impossible or unfeasible, at least in a foreseeable future. As a matter of 
fact, it is difficult to relate them to current research activities.
In this case, the corresponding definition in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
could be a combination of the «explicative definition» and a peculiar form of «stipula-
tive definition» that could be better qualified of «speculative».3
2.1.3 Real definitions
A third kind of definition is what we could call, along with Schummer (2007), «real 
definitions». These refer to a list of specific research topics included regularly under the 
denomination of «nanotechnology» in national research programs, research centers, 
scientific publications and conferences. This kind of definition is based on a historical 
use of the word, and it considers the concept as a set of elements that make up its ex-
tension.
But a definition based on a list like this presents some problems when used for ethical 
reflection. The first problem is that the research areas included in the list belong to very 
different disciplines, and it is almost impossible to find a common point between them. 
If this was not enough, they encompass the most advanced research in their respective 
fields. This problem could be partially solved if we spoke of «nanotechnologies» instead 
of using «nanotechnology», as Gordijn (2005) suggests. Another problem of this type of 
definition is that it is very unspecific, and it can differ substantially in time and in dif-
ferent countries. Anyhow, this definition does not tell us anything about the nature of 
«nano», and this does not help us in our task of forming a concept of «nanotechnology» 
that would enable us to identify possible ethical aspects.
3 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/definitions/. Accessed 8 April 2011
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2.2 Realist reflection
We accept the utility of all the different kinds of definitions mentioned above for 
their different purposes, like regulation. However, in our opinion, a more adequate 
definition for the purpose of ethical reflection could be found.
Our objective is to reflect philosophically on the moral issues that can arise from an 
eventual «nano-scope», that is to reflect on the existence of certain «moral facts» linked 
to nanotechnological entities. The existence of «moral facts» related to nanotechnolo-
gical entities seems connected to the existence of «epistemic facts» in these same enti-
ties, as both moral and epistemic facts are normative facts (Cuneo, 2007). Then, an 
epistemic realist approach could be seen as a good path to explore the elaboration of a 
definition of «nanotechnology». But even if moral realism (the acceptance of the exist-
ence of moral facts) is only a philosophical posture, an epistemic realist position (the 
acceptance of the existence of epistemic facts and therefore of objective epistemic 
truths) continues to be, in our opinion, an adequate option to think about the exist-
ence of a «nano-scope», to determine whether it is real (facts-based) or it is convention-
ally stipulated, and to formulate a suitable definition with the purpose of ethical reflec-
tion. Reaching a definition that captures the essence of the concept that we generically 
call «nanotechnology» appears then to be a task that will have to be done as we increase 
our scientific knowledge about it.
In this sense we could ask about our ability to recognize things in the world in suc-
cessive encounters, through time and in different conditions; we could ask about how 
we develop and use concepts –in this case the concept of «nanotechnology»– to iden-
tify a certain entity and to make, if necessary, an eventual task of classification. In this 
regard, Ruth Millikan’s proposals on what she calls «“substance” concepts» (Millikan 
2000) as a central factor in her explanation on the mission of human cognitive mecha-
nisms could be of some help, at least as a starting point. Millikan’s ideas about sub-
stances show indeed an Aristotelian inspiration.4 We must ask, in short, what makes 
something «nanotechnological» or what does being «nanotechnological» mean.
First we must ask about the nature of whatever we refer to through the use of the 
concept «nanotechnology». Which is its referent in the world? Is it a substance or a real 
kind?5 If nanotechnology is a substance or a real kind, then we should be able to make 
projections (forecasts) about the entity «nanotechnology». A sort of invariable «organi-
zing principle», with a real existence, which somehow gives us the ability to identify 
«nanotechnology» every time we come across it; the ability to recognize it, to learn 
4 Metaphysics, III, IV, IX. 
5 We refer here to «substance» and to «real kind» as understood by Ruth Millikan in Chapter 2 of On clear and 
confused ideas [7]: things we can learn things about that can be applied in successive encounters with them, for 
making projections and for which this possibility is not accidental but based on what we could call an «ontological 
ground of induction», or even «essence», in an extended sense.
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things during an encounter that could be applied to future encounters, to make well-
founded inductions, as with other substances that we get to know: «chair», «dog», «gold» 
or «chemistry». A «principle» that makes the substance be what it is and that, despite 
having a real existence and therefore an ontological character, is defined in epistemo-
logical terms because it helps us to recognize this substance, acting as a basis for making 
inductions about it. It is important to point out that our ability to identify substances is 
submitted to error, and that vagueness is an attribute of some concepts as could be the 
case for «nanotechnology».
In what could this «organizing principle» consist in the case of «nanotechnology»? It 
seems that the most intuitive answer is directly related to size (nanometric scale or 
nanoscale). But this solution is problematic for the reasons mentioned in the «Nominal 
definition» section. Thus, it seems appropriate to explore ways to complement it.
Let’s have a look at what the extension of the concept of the substance «nanotech-
nology» would be. It would be defined by the substance itself; a substance that must be 
found in the world in the form of certain entities (activities, applications, objects, 
materials) considered to be «nanotechnological». In this sense, when we say that a cer-
tain entity «is “nanotechnology”», we are actually saying that this entity is a part of 
«nanotechnology» or maybe that it is «nanotechnological». This leads us to define «na-
notechnology» as the set of entities considered to be nanotechnology, and we would 
then be talking of something very similar to the aforementioned «real definition». In 
this case we would still have to establish who has the right competence or authority to 
determine that an entity is «nanotechnology».
When we refer to an entity as a part of «nanotechnology», we must be aware that 
knowing that it is a part of nanotechnology leads us to some questions about this en-
tity which need to be answered in order to truly indentify it: What kind of entity are 
we talking about? To which field of science or technology does it belong? What new 
properties does it present? What are its dimensions? How can we use it? and so on.
At this point, and bearing in mind everything said above, we might also consider the 
possibility of thinking of «nanotechnology» as a kind of property (or set of properties) 
that certain entities (activities, applications, objects, materials) have, instead of consid-
ering it a substance. We would then be talking about the «nanotechnological» entities 
to refer to those activities, applications, objects and materials that have the property of 
«nanotechnology». We would then have to think about the property «being nanotech-
nological» and about the concept of the property «being nanotechnological». In this 
case the question is: What is for an entity «to be nanotechnological»?
2.2.1 An approach to a realist definition
In order to answer these questions, and whether we consider «nanotechnology» a 
property or a substance, we must first elucidate which are the real facts related with an 
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entity that cause certain properties to show up and that lead us to considering it nano 
(be it an activity, an application, an object or a material) and that are instead not pre-
sent in an analogous non-nano entity. What makes the difference between substance6 
«X» and substance «nano-X»? As we have already seen, «nanotechnology» is commonly 
used to refer to those things that meet certain size criteria; specifically, at least one of 
the physical dimensions of the entity has to be in the nanoscale, defined as the 1-100 
nm range. But these physical limits are not supported by scientific evidence, as we have 
already mentioned (SCENIHR, 2010).
According to researcher Amarnath Maitra there is no semantic parallelism between 
nanotechnology and nanomedicine. In other words, the same set of characteristics that 
make a certain technology «nanotechnology» are not always met when literature refers 
to «nanomedicine» (Maitra, 2010), as happens for instance with applications based on 
cellular uptake of nanosized materials such as drugs or other chemicals. He therefore 
believes that at least a part of what is known as «nanomedicine» should not be consi-
dered «nanotechnology». We can find a definition of nanotechnology in Maitra’s work 
that is quite interesting from the realist standpoint that we are proposing:
The study of physical properties such as electrical, optical, magnetic, mechanical and thermal 
characteristics of an entity in which the surface atoms dominate over the bulk atoms is called 
nanotechnology» Moreover: «Incidentally, an entity dominated by surface atoms and 
depleted by bulk atoms automatically assumes nano-size in one, two or all the three 
dimensions of the material. Therefore nanotechnology is the science and technology of 
surface atoms. Because of the size restriction of these surface atom-dominated entities, the 
mobile electrons are confined either in quantum wells, quantum wires or in quantum dots.7
According to this definition, even if size is a property that must be taken into ac-
count when pointing to the essence of «nano», it does not seem fully appropriate to 
make size the only parameter when defining the «nano-terminology».
What make us think that a differentiated entity is worth the name of «nanotechnol-
ogy» are the properties that are epistemically interesting to us in the entities that we call 
«nano». In other words, we are interested, epistemically speaking, in the discontinuities 
in the trends of some physical size-related properties (electrical, optical, magnetic, me-
chanical or thermal), and there is evidence that these discontinuities are a direct conse-
quence of an increase of the surface/volume ratio, which in turn is a direct consequence 
of the fact that surface atoms of those material objects dominate over the rest of bulk 
atoms (SCENIHR, 2010). It is true that an object accomplishing these conditions 
6 Substance from the chemistry point of view.
7 A. maitRa, 2010, Op. Cit.
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must necessarily have some or all its dimensions in a scale considered to be «nanomet-
ric» (1-100 nm), but this truth is in reality an accidental consequence of another fact. 
It seems that the ontological priority should be assigned rather to the fact that surface 
atoms predominate over bulk atoms than to the fact that the object has a certain size, 
because it is the first and not the latter (which actually is an effect of the first) that 
causes certain interesting properties to be relevant in that object. These properties can 
be associated to the scope of quantum phenomena, and cannot be observed when bulk 
atoms prevail over surface ones.
When surface atoms prevail, many of the properties of materials can vary in rela-
tion to the properties of these same materials at bigger scales; and it is precisely on 
these properties at the nano-scale that most of the applications of nanotechnologies 
base themselves, not exclusively on size as such. We are talking about properties such 
as electrical, optical, magnetic, mechanical or thermal. These «new» properties basi-
cally develop when, under certain restricted conditions, some quantum physics ef-
fects become relevant. Thus, if we considered a nominal definition based on a size 
range, how should we qualify an application where quantum effects were fundamen-
tal but with 200 nm objects, and so outside the stipulated «nano-metric range»? 
Could we consider it to be a «nano» application? And the other way round, should 
we consider «nano» an application based on objects within the stipulated size range, 
say 50 nm, even if no essential property of that application deviates from the trends 
shown in the macro scale? What if size was not even a fundamental feature for this 
application?
Given that the prevalence of surface atoms over bulk ones in certain entities gives 
origin to substantial differences when compared to entities with the opposite preva-
lence (perceptible through a number of physical properties over which we may per-
form based –not accidental– inductions), should we consider those entities to be dif-
ferent substances?8 Only a real scientific and technological novelty would eventually 
justify epistemically the use of a new terminology such as «nano». This novelty would 
have to be proved through the study of these entities and the practical use of their «new 
properties», or by determining that we are talking about different substances. This is 
what could be qualified as «revolutionary». The fact that an object is undetectable to 
the naked human eye –or even to certain devices– because of its smallness is a condi-
tion already assigned to the «microscopic world». And the fact of a smaller object fit-
ting in a smaller space is not exactly a new property either. This obviously does not 
mean that we can obviate the importance of the possibility of miniaturization down to 
the nanoscale as a facilitator for certain applications in which nanometric size certainly 
8 We understand here «substance» in the same sense as Millikan. So, a macrometric material shows physical prop-
erties (optical, electrical, thermic, mechanical or magnetical) very different to those of the «same» material in 
nanometric form (for example, gold vs. nanometric gold).
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makes a difference. This is the case in certain nano-objects with a size in the «detection 
threshold» of some «physiological sensors».
Thus, if we follow this reasoning, we could split somehow the universe of techno-
scientific entities in two: the ones with predominance of bulk atoms over surface atoms 
and the ones with predominance of surface atoms over bulk atoms. The existence 
of observable differences in properties between the entities with predominance of bulk 
atoms over surface atoms and the ones with predominance of surface atoms over bulk 
atoms is what a realistic definition of «nanotechnology» should keep in mind. The real-
istic definition should take into consideration the historic-causal linking relation be-
tween the features that make nanotechnological substances epistemically interesting, and 
thus meaningful to us –the new observable properties–, and the facts that cause these 
features.
As such, the observable properties in a particular substance are nothing but the ex-
pression of certain structural features in this substance. When surface (atoms) overcomes 
(in number) bulk (atoms), quantum effects take relevance in some observable proper-
ties. These relevant quantum effects are in fact changing the trends in which we base 
our projections about observable properties of what we considered –maybe wrongly, 
and that is the key– the same particular substance (for example gold as compared to 
nanometric gold). The direct cause for this phenomenon is that, in the «nanotechno-
logical» entities, there is predominance of surface atoms over bulk atoms and not the 
fact of being «nano-metric» per se, which would actually be a measurable consequence 
of the positive surface/bulk atoms balance itself. Surface atoms behave, at a quantum 
level, differently from bulk ones because they have different surrounding influences, 
and this is the reason for certain properties to show discontinuity at the point when 
predominance begins to be of surface over volume.
The possibility of submitting a specific property to a conventional measuring scale, 
as is the case of size in the metric scale, makes this property especially attractive at a 
practical level. But the ontological principle that provides us with an epistemic founda-
tion on which to build a concept and a realistic definition should be of a more solid 
nature. In the case of «nanotechnology» it seems reasonable to link this principle to the 
surface atoms versus bulk atoms ratio, which is the real fact that primarily causes 
the effects that will finally be of importance to us: the discontinuity of the trend in 
certain observable properties.
Changes in the relevance of certain quantum effects may constitute an intermedia- 
te cause of the final observable outcomes, but are indeed a consequence of a previous 
cause: the reversal of the surface/bulk atoms ratio. Similarly, the size of one or more 
dimensions of the entities should also be considered a measurable and observable effect 
of the initial fact (ontologically speaking) already mentioned. It is a task for nanoscien-
tific inquiry and for philosophical reflection to answer whether «being nanotechnolo-
gical» is in itself a property of some substances or whether it is a characteristic that would 
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allow us, based on a principle with ontological character, to consider new substances or 
natural kinds that would have to be represented and recognized through a differenti-
ated concept.
In summary, we consider that a feasible realist definition for nanoterminology that 
would allow us to fix the reflection framework for the ethical and social aspects 
that may arise from it could be based on the real facts mentioned: the existence of a 
discontinuity in certain observable physical properties (such as electrical, optical, mag-
netic, mechanical or thermal) (Maitra, 2010) that confer to the object in question 
certain characteristics, and the fact that this discontinuity has a causal relationship with 
the predominance of surface atoms over bulk ones. Of course, this necessarily implies 
that at least one of the external physical dimensions must be within the margins of 
what we call «the nanoscale». Whether or not this discontinuity is relevant for a spe-
cific application will determine the suitability of certain means as a way to achieve 
certain ends, but will not be pertinent as to determine whether the use of particular 
vocabulary to refer to certain reality is epistemically relevant. What we are proposing is 
a realistic definition strategy, an attempt to substantiate the combination of ontological 
and epistemic factors which are the heart of what «nanotechnology» actually is. Of 
course, a certain degree of vagueness must be accepted in a concept defined in such 
terms.
For nanotechnology to be the reference in the real world of a specific terminology in 
the language, it has to be identifiable as an ontologically differentiable entity (material 
or abstract), and thus based on the existence of an «ontological principle», an essence. It 
seems as well that something like the «ethical implications of nanotechnology» should 
be founded on the eventual moral implications of the use of «nanotechnological» enti-
ties related with the «ontological principle» that makes the entities being «nanotechno-
logical», and not of any use of them. Otherwise we will not be talking about «ethical 
implications of nanotechnology».
3. A realist reflection on the ethical implications of nanotechnologies
It is not new that technology, as a human activity, raises some aspects that may affect 
different spheres of societies’ and individuals’ lives. Consequently, a reflection from the 
ethical perspective is relevant. Certainly, throughout the history of civilizations there 
have been specific technological advances that brought with them new paradigms, the 
implications of which meant a qualitative leap, further than the ongoing quantitative 
accumulation that technological development always implies. These technological ad-
vances have sometimes deserved, generally a posteriori, the creation of new tools for 
ethical thinking. Genetics and biotechnology in general, or the so-called ICTs (Informa-
tion and Communication Technologies) and specially the Internet, are some examples 
of current technologies that have led to qualitative leaps and worth a special reflection.
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It has been said that nanotechnologies represent a new technological revolution; if 
this is true, nanotechnologies could be bringing another of these «qualitative leaps». As 
seen, it is convenient to determine first the object of reflection and then find out in 
which aspects it could represent a genuine revolution and in which ones it is just an-
other step forward in the continuous quantitative accumulation of scientific knowl-
edge and technological development. For this purpose it is therefore necessary to de-
fine nanotechnology in the proper terms. An adequate choice on which to base the 
definitions of the «nano-scope» could be to consider that reality is something that ex-
ists independently of subjects, and that «nanotechnology» –a part of reality we should 
care about– is something founded on real facts whose existence is independent of us.
As modern techno-science has an operational character, in its paradigm, an entity 
will be considered as part of reality if it has power to act, i.e. it is true if it allows us to 
operate on nature. For instance, particle size is considered a real criterion as it allows us 
to measure physical dimensions of particles (which is an action on actual particles). In 
this context, our epistemically realistic approach could be dismissed by someone as 
useless, if compared to approaches such as those that enable us to classify entities by 
measuring them by technological means. However, power to act, as a criterion, does 
not fully fit in our approach, which is meant to be helpful for reflection, and not just 
for operational, purposes. 
Nevertheless, size should not be totally discarded as one of the main properties that 
helps us to recognize nano-entities when considering their interaction with human be-
ings. If «being too small to be seen by the naked human eye» is the fact already as-
signed, as a vague borderline, to recognize the «microscopic» scope, other size-based 
borderlines related to «bio-detectability» –linked to immunologic system or to the 
blood brain barrier, for example– could be assignable to species of the «nano» gender.
Another problem directly derived from this need of definitions is the possibility of 
an unfounded use of the «nano-» terminology, as a mere marketing tool by publica-
tions, manufacturers, researchers or thinkers. If nanoterminology were to respond to a 
realistic definition of nanotechnology, this would help to properly identify its ethical 
and social implications. Obviously, a proper identification of ethical and social impli-
cations of nanotechnologies is an essential early step of the ethical reflection. We need 
to know what we are reflecting about and we need to know if it is new to us or, con-
versely, is something we already knew.
As a recent contribution, the European Commission, within its 7th Framework Pro-
gramme’s NanoCode9 project, is currently in the process of a multi-stakeholder dialogue 
collecting inputs to implement the European Code of Conduct for Nanosciences & 
9 http://www.nanocode.eu/. Accessed on 11/10/2011.
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Nanotechnologies Research. NanoCode Project is elaborating the CodeMeter,10 a tool 
to measure the degree of implantation of the Code, and has recently released the sec-
ond draft of its MasterPlan,11 a compilation of «issues and options on the path forward 
with the EC Code of Conduct on Responsible N&N Research». One of the conclu-
sions of the «Promoting responsible innovation: The future of the European Code of 
Conduct for Nanotechnologies» 12 international conference, held in Brussels in Sep-
tember 2011, was that it would be perhaps a good idea for the future of the «EU Code 
of Conduct for Nanosciences & Nanotechnologies Research» to be extended beyond 
«nano» to all emerging technologies, and beyond research to all the value chain, in part 
due to the difficulties found in the tasks of standardization and elaboration of defini-
tions and to the complexity of determining the degree of novelty of nanotechnologies13 
as such. This seems a solution that somehow would direct efforts of ethical reflection 
towards the new properties of nano-entities because of being new (the novelty factor) 
rather than because of their size.
4. Conclusions
Nanoscience and nanotechnology represent, according to several sources, a techno-
scientific revolution as they open a whole world of possibilities by acceding to certain 
levels of matter, and promise substantial changes for individuals, societies, humankind 
and the environment. These changes demand a philosophical reflection to tackle the 
aspects of an ethical, social and legal order that this revolution may lead to.
For a reflection about the ethical, social and legal aspects, a first step is to fix the 
scope of reflection and this requires a reflection upon the meaning of the terminology 
used within the framework of nanoscience and nanotechnology, a task addressed in 
different forums but that seems not to be solved yet as some authors admit.
The specialized literature gives us different types of definitions of «nanotechnology». 
The most common are nominal definitions, but teleological and real definitions are also 
to be found. Generally, the different kinds of definitions respond to the functions for 
which the definition is elaborated.
We think that a definition from a realist point of view, based in notions like «sub-
stance» or «essence» as existing things, could be feasible for the purpose of ethical reflec-
10 http://www.nanocode.eu/files/codemeter-draft.xls. Accessed on 11/10/2011.
11 http://www.nanocode.eu/files/masterplan-second-draft.pdf. Accessed on 11/10/2011.
12 http://www.nanocode.eu/content/view/225/40/.
13 NanoCode International Conference: «Promoting responsible innovation: The future of the European Code of Con-
duct for Nanotechnologies». «Extending the boundaries of the Code?» Round table with representatives of different 
Countries to illustrate the respective position about responsible innovation and discuss the possibility of extending 
the Code’s principles and approach on a global scale and beyond research.
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tion. A realist definition has to be founded on real entities, and on what (the essence) 
makes something (the substance) be what it is. The essence can be seen as an «organiza-
tional principle» of ontological character but defined in epistemological terms, because 
it enables us to learn things of the substance that will be useful for making inductive 
projections.
Under the realist point of view, if nanotechnology is a novelty, a revolution or some-
thing substantially different from other technologies (i.e. if it is a different substance or 
a different real kind) and deserves a specific terminology, it must have an essence, even 
if we are unable to define it.
In line with an extended and popular interpretation, what makes nanotechnology 
be what it is, it is the fact that at least one dimension of the objects involved in the ap-
plications is within a stipulated range (1-100 nm). Under a realist point of view, 
though, it seems more reasonable to consider that it is the fact of the existence of a 
discontinuity in certain observable properties of the objects, and that this discontinu-
ity has a direct causal link with the real fact of the number of surface atoms of these 
objects outweighing the number of bulk atoms and the resulting emerging new prop-
erties, mainly quantum-related. The fact that one or more dimensions of these objects 
are within the nanometric range is a necessary consequence of its high surface area/
volume ratio, but not the primary cause of the observed discontinuity in certain pro-
perties.
We may consider that the ethical, social and legal implications of nanotechnologies 
are those issues that could, in some ways, affect individuals’ lives, humankind develop-
ment and/or social progress, and are derived from a use of «nanotechnological» entities 
based in what it really makes them be nanotechnological, i.e. the «new» properties due 
to the predominance of surface atoms over bulk atoms. The implications of a use based 
upon already known properties of the matter, such as «a smaller object fits in a smaller 
space» or invisibility due to miniaturization, are very important and should be taken 
into account, but it is not clear whether they represent real novelties –with the possible 
exception of those related with detection limits of certain biological sensor systems 
unreached until now.
Some European thinkers are envisioning extending the ethical reflection scope, and 
in consequence the EU Code of Conduct, from nano- to emerging technologies as a 
possible solution to vagueness and/or to problems derived from the lack of definition 
of nanotechnologies.
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